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The SEC Ruling Forbidding Quantity
Discounts on Group Purchases From
Mutual Investment Companies
This Note considers SEC Rule N-22D-1 forbidding "quan-
tity discounts" to groups purchasing mutual investment
company shares for their members. After analyzing the rule
in reference to the statutory objectives it is designed to
promote, the author concludes that it can be justified,
although it does not promote all of the objectives relied
upon to support it and is somewhat inconsistent in
application.
THE SEC recently adopted Rule N-22D-1I interpreting
section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,2 and grant-
ing certain exemptions from that section as authorized by section
6(c).3 One effect of the rule is that quantity discounts may no longer
be granted to investment groups purchasing securities from open-end
mutual investment companies.4 Since the rule destroys the prime
economic reason for the existence of investment groups, they will
probably disband. Consequently, the reasons advanced by the SEC
for adoption of Rule N-22D-1, and possible difficulties in its appli-
cation, warrant careful consideration.
Open-end mutual investment companies are those in which the
shareholder may at any time present his certificates of stock for
1. SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 2798, Dec. 2, 1958.
2. Section 22(d), 54 Stat. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1952).
No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued by
it to any person except either to or through a principal underwriter for dis-
tribution or at a current public offering price described in the prospectus, and,
if such class of security is being currently offered to the public by or through
an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer shall
sell any such security to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter
or the issuer, except at a current public offering price described in the pros-
pectus....
3. 54 Stat. 802, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1952).
The Commission . . . may . . . exempt any person, security, or transaction,
or any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision
or provisions of this subchapter . . . if and to the extent that such exemption
is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the pro-
tection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and
provisions of this subchapter. ...
4. Rule N-22D-(a), SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 2798, Dec. 2, 1958
(hereafter cited as Rule N-22D-1, followed by the appropriate section).
redemption at net asset value.5 The early growth of the open-end
companies was accompanied by the development of questionable
sales tactics in response to severe competition.' Thus, it became
practically impossible for one company, or a small group of com-
panies, to raise the ethical standards of selling.7
Partly as a result of this competitive situation, Congress began
an exhaustive examination of the mutual investment company in-
dustry in 1935.8 The outcome was the enactment of the Investment
Company Act of 1940,' which was addressed in two ways to the
problem of unfair sales tactics. Section 22(d) required all sales of
redeemable securities to "any person" by the issuing company, its
principal underwriter, or dealers to be "at a current public offering
price described in the prospectus."' 0 Further, the act established
certain standards of disclosure designed to make available to all
members of the investing public "adequate, accurate, and explicit
information fairly presented concerning the character of such se-
curities and the circumstances, policies, and financial responsibilities
of such companies and their management.""
But it remained for the SEC to interpret the act, and that agency
construed "current public offering price" to permit the common
practice among open-end companies of granting graduated reduc-
tions in sales loads, depending on the amount of the purchase. The
computation of the amount of purchase was approved either on
the basis of (1) a single purchase,12 or (2) the aggregate acquisi-
5. With specified exceptions, redemptions must be made within seven days after
tender of the security to the investment company. Investment Company Act of
1940 § 22(e), 54 Stat. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1952).
6, Jaretzld, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WAsH. U.L.Q. 303, 307,
330 (1941).
7. Id. at 330.
8. See Stevenson, Investment Company Shares, 84 Tnusrs & Es-rATE 416, 4o00
23 (1947).
9. 54 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1952).
10. 54 Stat. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1952).
11. Section 1(b)(1), 54 Stat. 790, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(1) (1952). Section 8
provides for registration of investment companies with the SEC, and specifies in-
formation to be submitted, 54 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1952); § 29 provides
for the annual filing of reports and financial statements of the companies with the
SEC, 54 Stat. 836, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1952); § 44 provides that any information
filed by the companies with the SEC shall be made available to the public, unless
excepted by the SEC. 54 Stat. 845, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-44 (1952).
12. SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 89, March 14, 1941. To illustrate, in a
purchase of less than $15,000 of shares in Investors Selective Fund, Inc., the sales
charge is 6'%; but purchases of $1,000,000 and over carry a sales charge of only
1.%. Investors Selective Fund, Inc., Prospectus 12, Feb. 18, 1959. The sales charge
is based on a percentage of the public offering price. Thus, on a purchase of $14,000,
the sales charge is $920; while on a purchase of $1,000,000, the sales charge is
$15,000.
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tion value of shares previously purchased and then owned, plus
shares then being purchased.13
Perhaps to capitalize on this availability of "quantity discounts,"
some individual investors formed investment "groups," thereby
pooling their funds and purchasing open-end shares at discounts
which their personal resources would never enable them to obtain.14
Through group purchase plans, retirement security programs are
conducted with only a nominal portion of the investment "wasted"
on sales loads.'- A typical investment group operates as follows:
individual members regularly contribute to a "custodian" or "trus-
tee," which invests the contributions in its name in open-end shares
in lump-sum transactions;'" the investment companies then invest
the total contributions, less sales loads, in the stocks and bonds of
widely diverse enterprises. 7 Among the prominent investment
groups are one formed by physicians, one by dentists, and another
by college faculty members.18 The SEC approved the granting of
quantity discounts to these groups. 9
13. SEC Investment Co. Act Releases Nos. 1429., Feb. 24, 1950, and 1434, March
13, 1950. For example, if an investor had previously purchased and still owned
shares in Investors Selective Fund, Inc., for which he paid $10,000, and made a
subsequent purchase of shares for $6,000, the sales charge applicable to this latter
purchase would be 6%, the charge for sales between $15,000 and $20,000, and not634%.
14. To be distinguished from the investment groups here involved are investment
"clubs," which typically invest directly in the general securities market.
15. In Investors Selective Fund, Inc., for example, the percentage relationship
of amount invested to sales charge is as follows:
Amount Invested Sales Charge
To $15,000 63%
$15-20,000 6%
$20-25,000 59%
$25-30,000 5%
$30-50,000 44%
$50-100,000 4%
$100-200,000 3%
$200-400,000 3%
$400-700,000 24%
$700,000-1,000,000 2%
$1,000,000 and over 134%
Prospectus 12, Feb. 18, 1959.
16. For example, the University of Minnesota faculty group deposits Its mem-
bers' contributions with the Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis, which In turn
(1) invests the deposit monthly in its own name, and (2) maintains "trustee"
accounts for each member of the group.
17. E.g., Investors Selective Fund, Inc., Prospectus 1, Feb. 18, 1959.
18. The physicians' and dentists' groups are in Los Angeles; the faculty group
is at the University of Minnesota. 1,200 doctors and 500 dentists are members of
the two Los Angeles groups, and have invested more than $4,000,000 in open-end
shares. SEC, REPORT rN THE MATrE OF RuLE N-22D--1 OF TM INVESTMENT CONI-
PANY AcT OF 1940, at 97-98 (1958).
19. See Letter From SEC to the University of Minnesota Faculty Croup, July 30,
1954, on file in office of Professor John C. Kidneigh.
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Recently, however, the SEC concluded that allowing quantity
discounts to investment groups was undesirable, because (1) some
members of investment groups do not receive prospectuses of the
open-end companies in which their funds are invested, thereby
thwarting the disclosure requirements of both the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 and the Securities Act of 1933;20 and (2) the
practice involves discrimination contrary to the intent of section
22(d), since reduced prices are not being granted to single mem-
bers of the public, but to numerous individuals comprising selected
"classes" of persons."-
Consequently, on May 28, 1958, the SEC published notice that
it was considering the adoption of Rule N-22D--1.2 On December
2, 1958, after a consideration of oral arguments and written memo-
randa presented by interested parties, the rule was promulgated"
in the form in which it became effective on March 20, 1959.2r
Rule N-22D-1 codifies most of the SEC's interpretations of sec-
tion 22(d) and the exemptions from that provision granted under
section 6(c).25 Included is a codification of those interpretations
granting graduated reductions in sales charge to "any person" on
a quantity discount basis .2 However, the rule disallows the granting
of discounts to investment groups, defining the term "any person
to exclude "a group of individuals whose funds are combined di-
rectly or indirectly, for the purchase of redeemable securities," as
20. 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1952). Section 2(30) of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 provides that, for purposes of § 22, the word "prospectus" means
a written prospectus intended to meet the requirements of § 77j(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933; otherwise that the Securities Act's definition Is applicable.
54 Stat. 794, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(30) (Supp. V, 1958). Section 2(10) of the
Securities Act of 1933 defines "prospectus" as any communication offering securities
for sale, but provides that any communication in respect to a security shall not be
deemed a prospectus if it meets certain restrictions and states from whom a written
prospectus meeting the requirements of § 77j may be obtained. 48 Stat. 75, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(10) (Supp. V, 1958). Section 77j(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
requires that, with specified exceptions, all prospectuses must contain the facts
revealed by the issuing company in its registration statement to the SEC, and such
other information as the SEC designates. 48 Stat. 81, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (Supp V,1958).
21. SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 2718, May 28, 1958. The SEC also
noted that, since the granting of discounts to investment groups is discriminatory,
and.since group formation is often encouraged by open-end companies, their under-
writers, and distributors, the latter are engaging in discriminatory pricing policies
contrary to § 22(d). Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 2798, Dec. 2, 1958.
24. SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 2810, Dec. 19, 1958. The University of
Minnesota faculty group was granted an extension to Aug. 20, 1959. Letter From
Investors Diversified Services, Inc., to University of Minnesota Faculty Group (not
dated), on file in office of Professor Robert C. McClure.
25. See SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 2798, Dec. 2, 1958.
26. Rule N-22D-1(a).
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well as "a trustee, agent, custodian, or other representative of such
a group of individuals.""
The desirability of the rule can be appraised by analyzing the
reasons advanced for its adoption.
(1) The disclosure requirements of the acts of 193 and 1940 are
being thwarted. The purpose behind the disclosure requirements of
the 1933 and 1940 acts is to assure that companies issuing securities
make accurate information available to the investing public so that
an investor has sufficient data to make enlightened investment
choices. 8 Furthermore, as a condition precedent to the investment
of funds in at least one of the prominent investment groups -the
college faculty group -members are required to submit written
acknowledgment of receipt of a prospectus of the open-end com-
pany in which their funds will be invested.2" Perhaps the other
groups have similar conditions to membership. If so, the opportunity
for investor enlightenment is probably present, and the disclosure
requirements are being satisfied.
However, it is conceivable that there are investment groups in
which leadership is, by oversight, indifference, or exploitation, less
conscientious in seeing that all members have access to prospec-
tuses. Many of the members of such groups might blindly contribute
to a "good deal," oblivious to any possible peril in the investment,
or to the existence of prospectuses which might apprise them of
that peril. Although it might be argued that most of those members
could not interpret a prospectus to advantage anyway, the statutes
are designed to provide the opportunity to secure this information,
and it is this opportunity which may be lacking. Apparently, the
disclosure purpose of the rule is primarily directed at this latter type
of group, or at least in anticipation of the development of such
groups.30
However, since the companies were unanimous in their support
of the rule,31 the suspicion is irresistible that it was promulgated at
their instigation to increase profit margins on sales; that the regu-
lated dictated to the regulating agency.3 2 Superficially, at least, other
27. Ibid.
28. See CHOKA, AN INThRODUCTION TO SEcUIUITEs RE ULATION 23, 92 (1958).
29. Interview With Members of University of Minnesota Faculty Group, April
30, 1959.
30. It is also probable that investment groups other than those mentioned previ-
ously (see note 18 supra) were being organized at the solicitation of investment
company sales representatives.
31. SEC, REPORT IN THE MATTER OF RULE N-22D-1 OF THE INVESTMENT COM-
PANY AcT OF 1940, at 5, 34, 68 (1958).
32. "[A] commission finds its survival as a regulatory agency dependent heavily
on its facility in reaching a modus operandi with the regulated groups." BERNSrEN,
REGULATiNG BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMfMISSION 155 (1955). For a general dis-
cussion of the control of regulators by the regulated, see 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTIATIVE
LAW § 1.03, at 18-24 (1958).
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circumstances do little to abate this suspicion. For instance, it might
be argued that if the SEC is interested in upholding disclosure re-
quirements on behalf of members of investment groups, it is strange
that it has indicated no similar interest on behalf of members of
the many variations of investment clubs, which do not invest in
open-end shares, but in the general securities market. Furthermore,
the rule continues to allow discounts, inter alia, to employee benefit
plans qualifying under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code,s3
to organizations described in sections 501(c) (3) and (13) of the
code,34 and to certain family units.3" It might be argued that the
disclosure requirements are no less satisfied in regard to members
of investment groups than to members of these preferred groups.
But most of these doubts about the real purpose of the rule can
be dispelled. In the first place, it is doubtful that lust for greater
profit margins was a moving force behind the open-end companies'
support of the rule. To the extent that quantity discounts reflect
decreased expenses to the companies handling large purchases, any
increased revenue realized from selling at nondiscounted prices in
accordance with the rule would be consumed by the increased ex-
pense of selling and handling the smaller sales to the individuals
formerly comprising the groups. Even more convincing, the com-
panies must have realized that, deprived of discounts, the former
group members would probably invest their smaller sums elsewhere
than in open-end shares, and if the groups remained intact, they
would certainly invest elsewhere.
Secondly, the SEC's tolerance of investment clubs may be explica-
ble on the ground that it probably lacks power to regulate such
distinctly local, and usually small, undertakings. 30 Furthermore,
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401. Section 401 plans are pension, profit-sharing,
or other employee benefit trusts of an employer. Those benefiting from membership
in such a group must constitute either at least 70% of all employees, or at least
80% of all employees eligible to benefit, provided that at least 70% of all employees
are so eligible.
34. INT. RE;V. CODE oF 1954, §§ 501(c)(3), (13). Such organizations include
"corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes ... no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. ..." Section 501(c)(3).
In addition, "cemetery companies owned and operated exclusively for the benefit
of their members or which are not operated for profit, and any corporation char-
tered solely for burial purposes as a cemetery corporation and not permitted by its
charter to engage in any business not necessarily incident to that purpose, no part
of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or in-
dividual. Section 501(c)(13).
35. Le., an individual, his spouse, and their children under the age of 21.
36. But just as the SEC, by Rule N-229D-1, indirectly regulates investment groups
by regulating investment companies, it might conceivably exercise control over
investment clubs through direct regulation of brokers by imposing certain condi-
tions upon sales to any person the broker has reason to believe represents an in-
vestment club.
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investment clubs invest perhaps entirely through brokers in trans-
actions executed on exchanges, or in the open or counter market,
rather than in original issue securities, and such investments are
exempt from the prospectus requirements of the Securities Act. 7
There may be a possibility, however, that if a club is of substantial
size, membership in it will constitute a "security," subject to fed-
eral securities legislation, including the disclosure requirements.3 8
Thirdly, family group investment schemes are easily reconcilable
with the disclosure requirements. If one member of a family group
qualifying under the rule has access to a prospectus, probably all
members of that family do. 9
Fourthly, investment programs conducted by organizations de-
scribed in sections 401 and 501(c) (3) and (13) of the Internal
Revenue Code are reconcilable with the disclosure requirements,
although many members of these organizations may never have
opportunity to read the prospectuses of the open-end companies
in which they invest. In investment groups, the individual members,
not the groups, are the real investors. This is indicated by the fact
that the group custodian maintains separate trust accounts for each
member.40 On the other hand, though benefits ultimately accrue
to employees of companies offering section 401 retirement pro-
grams, and though sums invested by companies are largely em-
ployee payroll deductions, participants in section 401 plans are
investing in a company undertaking. Perhaps more significantly,
by agreeing that deductions from their pay be invested pursuant to
section 401 programs, the employees are, in reality, nominating the
employers as their investing agents. Since section 501(c) (3) and
(13) organizations are, by and large, units "no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual," they can seldom be member-oriented for investment
purposes. Consequently, the disclosure requirements are satisfied in
regard to the section 401 and 501 organizations if those deciding in-
vestment policy for the investors or investor have access to pros-
pectuses.
Thus, since it is doubtful that the open-end companies instigated
Rule N-22D-1 for the purpose of enhancing profit margins, and
since the activities of investment clubs, family groups, and section
401 and 501 organizations can be reconciled with disclosure re-
quirements, the rule may be sincerely directed at disclosure prob-
37. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1952); Se-
curities Act of 1933 § 5, 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (Supp. V, 1958).
38. See Legal Problems Created by the Formation and Operation of Inveshnent
Clubs, 106 U. OF PA. L. REv. 832, 835-43 (1958).
39. See note 36 supra.
40. Letter From SEC to Minnesota Faculty Group, July 30, 1954, on file in office
of Professor John C. Kidneigh.
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lems presented by investment groups. And even if the rule is an
SEC response to dictation of the companies, that fact is irrelevant to
whether it can be justified.
But however well-meaning, the rule overlooks the fact that the
programs of investment groups are also reconcilable with disclosure
requirements, whether or not prospectuses reach the members.
If an investor desires to place the determination of his invest-
ments with an investment group, he is freely assuming the risk
of his lack of access to prospectuses. He is making the group his
agency for investment purposes, and the availability of prospec-
tuses to the group members as a whole offers very considerable
protection to him.
SEC concern with such voluntary "waivers" by group members
of access to prospectuses is inconsistent with the philosophy of the
disclosure requirements.41 And even if investment group activities
could not be reconciled with disclosure requirements, it is doubtful
that effectively destroying the investment groups to maintain the
required standards of disclosure was necessary. The disclosure pur-
pose of the statutes could have been effectuated by a rule requiring
open-end companies to distribute their prospectuses to all group
members before selling shares to investment groups, and to receive
written acknowledgment from those members as evidence to the
SEC of such distribution.
(2) The allowance of discounts to investment groups involves dis-
crimination contrary to the intent of section 22(d), because reduced
prices are not being granted to single members of the public, but to
numerous individuals comprising selected "classes" of persons. Be-
fore Rule N-22D-1 can be condemned as ill-founded, or as employ-
ing a needlessly harsh means of achieving its purpose, it must be
remembered that it is not directed solely as upholding disclosure re-
quirements. The rule also purports to eliminate discrimination in
violation of section 22(d), which the SEC believes inherent in
granting discounts to investment groups.' If the SEC is correct in
that belief, it properly withdrew discounts from those groups. The
crucial inquiry, therefore, is whether group discounting practices
violate the anti-discrimination purport of section 22(d).
The purposes behind the anti-discrimination intent of section
22(d) are twofold: (1) to eliminate discrimination per se among
purchasers of open-end shares; and (2) to assure the orderly distri-
bution of open-end shares. 3 Analysis suggests that both purposes
are defeated by the granting of discounts to investment groups.
In the first place, the practice involves discrimination per se.
41. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
42. SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 2798, Dec. 2, 1958.
43. Ibid.
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Arguably, discrimination is no more present in group discounting
than in any quantity discount practice. Perhaps some people of
moderate means, who seldom qualify for quantity discounts feel
that the entire quantity discount concept discriminates against them
and that the use of groups to procure discounts only minimizes this
discrimination.
However, even if there is discrimination in quantity discounting
generally, it cannot seriously be considered malum in se. There is
nothing offensive in granting an identical discount to all investors
having nearly identical amounts of money to invest. On the other
hand, some unfairness may exist in imposing one sales load on a
single investor having a certain amount to invest, and yet imposing
a lesser sales load on his neighbor, who has an identical amount
to invest, simply because the neighbor pools his money with a
group.
A criticism of Rule N-22D-1 might include the argument that
the granting of discounts to investment groups is not necessarily
discriminatory, but may only reflect an adjustment in price corre-
sponding with the decreased expense of handling large orders. Even
to the extent that discounts do reflect decreased expenses on large
orders, this argument fails to account for the fact that section 22(d)
is concerned with sales of open-end shares, at prices described in
the prospectuses, to "any person.""'
Moreover, this argument overlooks the second purpose behind
the anti-discrimination intent of section 22(d); that is, to assure
orderly distribution of open-end shares." When the same amount of
money can result in a greater or lesser investment depending on
whether it is invested through a group purchase plan, a comIpelling
pressure toward group affiliation may be exerted on the investor.
Furthermore, the realization that investors can be encouraged to
buy open-end shares by the promise of high discounts through group
purchases may exert a compelling pressure upon the open-end se-
curity dealers to foster group purchases. Manifestly, these pressures
on both investor and distributor, each trying to parlay the price
variable to his advantage, would introduce an element of disorder.
And, by succumbing to the allurements of grouping, the investor
would be completely restricted in investment choice, not neces-
sarily to the companies he considered sound, but to whatever com-
pany his group happened to patronize. Such a situation would be
similar to that which appeared during the early days of the invest-
ment company industry when distributors were likewise promoting
44. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(d), 54 Stat. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
22(d) (1952). "'Person' means a natural person or a company." Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 § 2(27), 54 Stat. 794, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(27) (1952).
45. Note 44 supra.
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sales by offering variable prices for fixed numbers of shares, and
many investors were too preoccupied with finding a company grant-
ing generous discounts to seriously examine the merits of the avail-
able securities.46 That is precisely the type of disorder section 22(d)
is designed to prevent."
But; as with the disclosure requirements, if the rule is honestly
intended to eliminate discrimination, it would appear to harbor
gross inconsistencies by prohibiting discounts to investment groups,
but not to employee benefit plans qualifying under section 401 of
the Internal Revenue Code, organizations described in sections
501(c) (3) and (13) of the Code, nor to certain family groups;
and by allowing no-load sales to personnel of investment companies,
their underwriters, and distributors.48
Since by definition no part of the net earnings of many of the
preferred section 501 organizations can inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual, 49 it is evident that these organiza-
tions invest to fulfill their goals as organizational entities, rather than
for their members' individual investment purposes. Consequently,
the members of most of these organizations could not possibly enjoy
a discriminatory advantage from discounted purchases of open-end
shares by their organizations. But even though the activities of many
of the preferred section 501 organizations can thus be reconciled
with section 22(d), it is doubtful that this reasoning explains their
preferred status. Rather, by omitting them from its "any person"
definition,50 the rule makes no attempt to harmonize their receipt
of discounts with the anti-discrimination purport of section 22(d).
Its preferred treatment of the 501 organizations must therefore be
attributable to the SECs section 6(c) authorization to grant exemp-
tions from the act "to the extent that such exemption[s] ... [are]
...in the public interest and consistent with the protection of
investors and the purposes [of the act]""' Thus, discrimination is not
even in issue, but only the desirability of the SEC's exercise of its
section 6(c) prerogative. Although it is perhaps mystifying why the
rule favors organizations described in sections 501(c) (3) and (13),
and not some of the other section 501 organizations which appear
equally entitled to special consideration, 52 it is clear that investment
47. See JaretzKd, supra note 6, at 829-82.
47. I1W.
48. Rule N-22D-1(h).
49. See text at note 40 supra.
50. A separate paragraph of the rule allows discounts to § 501(c)(8) and (18)
organizations. Rule N-22D-I(e).
51. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 6(c), 54 Stat. 802., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
6(c) (1952).
52. Section 501 organizations not allowed discounts under Rule N--D-1 in-
clude the following:
(1) Corporations organized for the exclusive purpose of holding title to property,
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groups of physicians, dentists, and college professors are not so
dedicated to comparable public welfare and charity ends that public
interest demands the granting of a section 6(c) exemption to them.
On the other band, instead of receiving a section 6(c) exemp-
tion, section 401 employee benefit plans are included in the rule's
definition of "any person."5 3 Hence, these groups are favored not for
policy reasons, but because the SEC apparently believes that their
enjoyment of discounts does not involve discrimination under sec-
tion 22(d). There may be some conceptual basis for this belief in
the argument that companies participating in section 401 plans are
investing in company undertakings, and hence such "plans" are
single investing entities which should come within the "any person"
ambit of the rule. In principle, however, there is no practical differ-
ence between those section 401 plans in which employee payroll
deductions form a large part of the companies' investments, and in
the investment groups. Like members of investment groups, the
employee-members of 401 plans are investing their money in
open-end shares through a group medium to obtain retirement
security, and are thereby receiving discounts which their solitary
investments could not gain. Therefore, if there is discrimination in
granting discounts to investment groups, there is certainly discrim-
ination in granting discounts to section 401 groups characterized by
payroll deductions.
However, the discrimination involved in granting discounts to
section 401 plans is perhaps less serious than that resulting from dis-
counts to investment groups. Since employee benefit programs are
institutions of the employing entities, not the individual employees,
authentic single entities are investing.
To include the specified family groups in the "any person" defini-
tion is but to acknowledge economic realities. Whatever the pur-
chase, these groups are usually single buying entities 11 and there is
nothing offensive in so treating them for purposes of securities pur-
chases, especially since the funds for most family investments are
derived from one person. In addition, enforcement of the rule would
be impossible if it disallowed such family grouping.
Unquestionably, the selling of shares at no salesload to personnel
of investment companies, their underwriters, and distbutors is
discriminatory. However, these personnel must be employed for
collecting income therefrom, and turning it over to an organization which is tax
exempt. Section 501(c)(2).
(2) Civic organizations not organized for profit but operating exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare. Section 501(c) (4).
(3) "Labor, agricultural, or horticultural associations." Section 501(c) (5).
53. Rule N-22D--1(a).
54. See note 35 supra.
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ninety days before qualifying for such purchases, 5 so it is doubtful
that discount-free purchases are their principal motivation for
working where they do. Consequently, this discrimination is not
likely to cause disorder in the general market for these shares.
Furthermore, these purchasers must sign a written pledge that their
purchases are for investment, and not speculation;50 and the se-
curities so purchased can be resold only to the issuing company.5
Finally, to enhance employee loyalty and morale, it is an accepted
and perhaps commendable business practice in many phases of busi-
ness both to grant employee discounts on employers' wares, and to
give employees a financial stake in the success of the business.
Enforcement
In most cases, open-end companies can be expected to cooperate
diligently with the SEC to enforce the rule. Oral arguments pre-
sented by representatives of both the companies and associations
of companies voiced unanimous support of the rule." Also, the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 prescribes severe penalties for vio-
lations of the act's provisions, and, impliedly, the SEC's rulings
relative to the act.5 9 Federal district courts are given substantial
discretion in such matters and may enjoin future violations, 60 or
even direct disposal of the offending company's assets."s Since sales-
men are also subject to the act's penal sanctions, 2 it is predictable
that they too will endeavor to abide by the rule.
A procedure that might assist enforcement of the new rule would
be that of requiring the open-end companies to obtain statements
from all their purchasers that the purchases in question were being"
made for a single trust estate, or a single fiduciary account.3 A
similar procedure is not without precedent in other areas. The
Federal Reserve Board, for example, enforces a requirement that
banks obtain statements from their borrowers that they do not in-
tend to use loans to purchase listed securities in violation of mar-
ginal requirements."
55. Rule N-22D-I(h).
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. SEC, op. cit. supra note 81, at 5, 84, 68.
59. Sections 41, 48, 54 Stat. 842, 846, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-41, 80a-48 (1952).
60. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 41(e), 54 Stat. 843, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
41(e) (1952).
61. Ibid.
62. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 48, 54 Stat. 846, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48
(1952).
63. IDS Comments on SEC Notice of Proposal to Adopt Rule N-22D-1, at 9,
June 24, 1958.
64. Ibid.
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Conclusion
As a result of the foregoing analysis, it appears that the granting
of discounts to selected "classes" of investors investing through the
investment group medium involves discrimination per se, contrary
to the intent of section 22(d), and also tends to introduce an ele-
ment of disorder in the distribution of open-end shares which the
anti-discrimination intent of section 22(d) meant to eliminate. Fur-
thermore, the allowance of discounts to organizations described in
section 501(c) (3) and (13), to certain family groups, and perhaps
to investment company personnel is reconcilable either with sec-
tion 6(c) or section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act, or with
long-established business customs. However, in allowing discounts
to section 401 plans, the rule sanctions discrimination nearly iden-
tical to that it declares objectionable in granting discounts to in-
vestment groups. Therefore, while the withdrawal of discounts from
investment groups is justified, it is impeachable on the basis that
Rule N-22D-1 is inconsistent in its application. And, as observed
earlier, the rule fails to fulfill its purpose of promoting disclosure
requirements.
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